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  1 
Fixing Forum Selling  
Brian L. Frye & Christopher J. Ryan, Jr.* 
 “Forum selling” is jurisdictional competition intended to attract 
litigants. While consensual forum selling may be beneficial, non-
consensual forum selling is harmful because it encourages 
jurisdictions to adopt an inefficient pro-plaintiff bias. In the last 
20 years, the Eastern District of Texas has adopted an aggressive 
and remarkably successful policy of non-consensual forum selling 
in patent infringement actions. In 2016, 44% of all patent 
infringement actions were filed in the Eastern District of Texas, 
and 93% of them were filed by patent assertion entities or “patent 
trolls.”  
In December 2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in TC 
Heartland v. Kraft, to consider the definition of corporate 
residence for the purpose of patent venue. If the Court adopts the 
narrow definition suggested by TC Heartland, it would effectively 
prevent the Eastern District of Texas from engaging in non-
consensual forum selling in patent infringement actions. 
However, it could also unduly restrict patent venue. This Article 
argues that the Court could stop non-consensual forum selling in 
patent infringement actions by requiring district courts to decide 
motions to transfer venue before deciding any other motions or 
entering any substantive orders. This would prevent non-
consensual forum selling by making it impossible for a district to 
offer bias as a salient incentive to marginal plaintiffs, and it would 
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make litigation more efficient by ensuring that actions reach the 
appropriate district as quickly as possible. 
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I.     INTRODUCTION 
I waive me right to be thried by an incorruptible, fair, an’ 
on-prejudiced judge. Give me wan that’s onfair an’ 
prejudiced an’ that ye can slip somethin’ to.1 
Justice demands impartiality. A biased court makes a sham of due 
process. And biased courts are not only unjust, but also inefficient because 
they enable rent-seeking. But sometimes, courts have an incentive to adopt 
a bias. For example, courts have long engaged in “forum selling,” or 
jurisdictional competition intended to attract litigants. While consensual 
forum selling can be beneficial since it often encourages efficiency and 
impartiality, non-consensual forum selling is harmful, because it 
encourages courts to adopt inefficient pro-plaintiff biases. However, non-
consensual forum selling is possible only if venue is proper. 
In TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands LLC, the Supreme Court 
of the United States will consider the scope of venue in a patent 
infringement action against a corporate defendant.2 Patent venue is 
governed by a different statute than general venue, but under both statutes, 
venue is proper in any district in which a corporate defendant “resides.”3 
                                                                                                             
1 FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY SAYS 171 (1907). 
2 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Grp. LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016). 
3 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b)(1) (2012); 1400(b) (2012). 
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Under the general venue statute, a corporate defendant “resides” in any 
district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction in the action.4 In 1957, 
the Supreme Court held that under the patent venue statute, a corporate 
defendant only “resides” in its state of incorporation and the districts 
where it practices the patent.5 But in 1990, the Federal Circuit held that the 
1988 revision of the general venue statute applied its definition of 
corporate residence to the patent venue statute.6 
The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the definition of corporate 
residence for the purpose of patent venue had the unexpected consequence 
of enabling courts to engage in non-consensual forum selling in patent 
infringement actions.7 Since about 1999, the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Texas has aggressively pursued a policy of non-
consensual forum selling in patent infringement actions with remarkable 
success. While the Eastern District of Texas is largely rural and home to 
few patent owners or alleged infringers, it heard 44% of the patent 
infringement actions filed in 2016.8 Most of those actions were filed by 
patent assertion entities—or “patent trolls”—attracted by the district’s pro-
plaintiff rules and juries.9 The Federal Circuit, which has exclusive 
jurisdiction over patent appeals, has repeatedly tried to stop this non-
consensual forum selling by ordering the Eastern District of Texas to 
transfer patent infringement actions to other districts, with little success.10 
In TC Heartland, the Court will consider whether the Federal Circuit 
correctly interpreted the definition of corporate residence for the purpose 
of patent venue.11 Obviously, it does so against the backdrop of rampant 
non-consensual forum selling in patent actions. The Court could probably 
stop non-consensual forum selling in patent actions by holding that the 
narrow definition of corporate residence for the purpose of patent venue it 
adopted in 1957 still applies. Under that definition, the Eastern District of 
Texas would almost never be a proper venue for a patent action. But doing 
so would also significantly restrict the scope of patent venue and prevent 
patent plaintiffs from filing actions in otherwise appropriate districts. It 
                                                                                                             
4 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2012). 
5 Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957). 
6 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
7 See, e.g., Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CA. L. REV. 241, 242-
46 (2016). 
8 See, e.g., Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at 
Patent Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2017). 
9 See, e.g., id. 
10 See In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319–21 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re 
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 587 F.3d 1333, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Zimmer 
Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 
1361, 1362, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
11 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Grp. LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016). 
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could even encourage forum aversion, by enabling potential infringers to 
limit their exposure to patent actions to particular districts. 
In theory, Congress could also stop non-consensual forum selling in 
patent actions by revising the patent venue statute. It is currently 
considering a bill that would revise the patent venue statute by limiting the 
scope of patent venue and facilitating mandamus relief.12 But this bill is 
unlikely to pass and would probably have the same negative consequences 
as a judicial narrowing of the scope of patent venue. 
However, the Court could easily and probably more effectively 
prevent non-consensual forum selling in patent actions by holding that 
district courts must decide motions to transfer venue before ordering 
discovery and must stay discovery pending appeal of their decision. Courts 
cannot engage in non-consensual forum selling unless they can retain 
jurisdiction over an action long enough to impose a salient discriminatory 
burden on the defendant. The Eastern District of Texas’s primary method 
of imposing a discriminatory burden on patent defendants is by ordering 
extensive early discovery, which induces many defendants to settle.13 If 
the court could not impose discovery before an action is transferred, its 
ability to engage in non-consensual forum shopping in patent actions 
would be sharply curtailed. 
This approach would prevent non-consensual forum selling in patent 
actions without limiting the scope of patent venue. Patent plaintiffs would 
retain a broad selection of appropriate venues, but they would be prevented 
from choosing inappropriate venues based on their pro-plaintiff bias. 
Requiring courts to wait for the final resolution of motions to transfer 
before ordering discovery should prevent non-consensual forum selling 
across the board, not just in patent actions. For example, evidence suggests 
that courts have engaged in forum selling in mass tort and bankruptcy 
actions as well, and such an approach would curb forum selling in these 
types of actions too.14 For these reasons, and those we articulate below, we 
argue that this approach is the preferred approach for the Court to employ 
in order to fix forum selling. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
12 Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act, S. 2733, 114th Cong. (2016). 
13 See, e.g., Love & Yoon, supra note 8. 
14 Klerman & Reilly, supra note 7, at 285. 
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A. A Brief History of Patent Venue 
Originally, federal venue was quite limited. Under the Judiciary Act 
of 1789, federal venue was proper only in a district where a defendant 
resided or received service of process.15 Throughout the 19th century, 
whenever the Supreme Court adopted an expansive reading of the federal 
venue statutes, Congress enacted narrowing amendments. In 1877, the 
Supreme Court expanded the potential scope of federal venue by holding 
that a state could require a company to consent to venue as a condition of 
doing business.16 Congress responded in 1887 by narrowing the scope of 
federal venue, providing that it was proper in federal question actions only 
in the district where the defendant resided, but was proper in diversity 
actions in the districts where either the plaintiff or the defendant resided.17 
In 1893, the Supreme Court held that the statutory limitation on federal 
venue did not apply to patent actions, and that patent venue was proper in 
any district where the defendant was subject to service of process.18 
Congress again responded in 1897 by explicitly narrowing the scope of 
patent venue, providing that it was proper only in the districts where the 
defendant resided or practiced the patent.19 
                                                                                                             
15 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, § 11 (“And no civil suit shall be brought 
before either of said courts against an inhabitant of the United States, by any original 
process in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant, or in which he shall be 
found at the time of serving the writ . . . .”); Chaffee v. Hayward, 61 U.S. 208, 212 (1858). 
16 Ex parte Schollenberger, 96 U.S. 369, 376 (1877) (“They have in express terms, in 
consideration of a grant of the privilege of doing business within the State, agreed that they 
may be sued there.”). 
17 Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552 (“and no civil suit shall be brought, before 
either of said courts against any person by any original process of proceeding in any other 
district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on 
the fact that the action is between citizens of different States, suit shall be brought only in 
the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant”); revised by Act of 
August 13, 1888, ch. 866, 25 Stat. 433. 
18 In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 663-64 (1893) (“[W]e are of opinion that the provision 
of the existing statute, which prohibits suit to be brought against any person ‘in any other 
district than that whereof he is an inhabitant,’ is inapplicable to an alien or a foreign 
corporation sued here, and especially in a suit for the infringement of a patent right; and 
that, consequently, such a person or corporation may be sued by a citizen of a state of the 
Union in any district in which valid service can be made upon the defendant.”) 
19 Act of March 3, 1897, ch. 395, 29 Stat. 695, § 48. (“[I]n suits brought for the 
infringement of letters patent the circuit courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction, 
in law or in equity, in the district of which the defendant is an inhabitant, or in any district 
in which the defendant, whether a person, partnership, or corporation, shall have committed 
acts of infringement and have a regular and established place of business.”). See also 
Stonite Prod. Co. v. Melvin Lloyd Co., 315 U.S. 561, 566 (1942) (holding that Section 48 
of the Act of 1897 “is the exclusive provision controlling venue in patent infringement 
proceedings”). 
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The Federal Judicial Code of 1948 amended the federal venue rules, 
enacting a new general venue rule and a new patent venue statute.20 The 
general venue statute provided that federal venue was proper in federal 
question actions only in the district where all of the defendants resided, 
but was proper in diversity actions in the districts where either all of the 
plaintiffs or all of the defendants resided.21 But the statute also provided, 
“A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is 
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such 
judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for 
venue purposes.”22 Consequently, in an action against a corporate 
defendant, federal venue was typically proper in almost any district. 
The patent venue statute provides: “Any civil action for patent 
infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant 
resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and 
has a regular and established place of business.”23 In 1957, the Supreme 
Court held that the definition of corporate residence provided in the 
general federal venue statute did not change the definition of corporate 
residence for the purpose of patent venue.24 Accordingly, the “residence” 
of a corporate defendant in a patent infringement action was its state of 
incorporation and any state in which it practiced the patent.25 
The Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988 
amended the general venue statute: “[f]or purposes of venue under this 
chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to reside in any 
judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the 
action is commenced.”26 A defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction if 
it “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within 
the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.”27 
This includes intentionally sending goods to the forum state.28 As a 
consequence, general venue in an action against a corporate defendant 
typically became proper in almost any district. 
                                                                                                             
20 62 Stat. 907 (1948). 
21 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) (2012). 
22 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2012). 
23 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2012). 
24 Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957). 
25 Id. 
26 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100- 
702, 102 Stat. 4642 
27 See, e.g., J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787-88 (2011) 
(quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). 
28 Id. (“Sometimes a defendant does so by sending its goods rather than its agents. The 
defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the 
defendant can be said to have targeted the forum.”). 
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In 1990, the Federal Circuit held that the addition of the phrase “under 
this chapter” to the general venue statute implied that the definition of 
corporate residence provided in the general venue statute also applies to 
the patent venue statute.29 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that 
a corporate defendant in a patent action also “resides” in any district where 
that defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction.30 Given the broad 
interpretation of personal jurisdiction over corporations, patent venue in 
an action against a corporate defendant was suddenly proper in almost any 
district, enabling non-consensual forum selling. 
The Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011 
further amended the general venue statute to provide: “[e]xcept as 
otherwise provided by law this section shall govern the venue of all civil 
actions brought in district courts of the United States.”31  In addition, the 
amended statute adds: “[f]or all venue purposes . . . an entity with the 
capacity to sue and be sued in its common name under applicable law, 
whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in 
any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court’s 
personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question and, if a 
plaintiff, only in the judicial district in which it maintains its principal 
place of business.”32 While it did not amend the text of the patent venue 
statute, it conceivably affected the definition of corporate residence for the 
purpose of patent venue.33 
B. Forum Shopping 
“Forum shopping” is a pejorative term for choosing to litigate a civil 
action in the forum most favorable to yourself.34 United States 
                                                                                                             
29 VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F. 2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
30 Id. 
31 125 Stat. 758 § 202 (Dec. 7, 2011) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1) (2012)). 
32 125 Stat. 758 § 102 (Dec. 7, 2011) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) (2012)). 
33 Interestingly, the general venue statute refers to “a defendant,” but the patent venue 
statute refers to “the defendant,” which may suggest that Congress did not intend the 
definition of corporate residence in the general venue statute to apply to the definition of 
residence in the patent venue statute. 
34 See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 590 (5th ed. 1979) (“Forum Shopping. Such 
occurs when a party attempts to have his action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction 
where he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or verdict.”). See also Skelly 
Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 
317, 333 (1967) (referring to forum shopping as a “national legal pastime”); and Helene 
Curtis Indus. v. Sales Affiliates, 105 F. Supp. 886, 902 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 199 F.2d 732 (2d 
Cir. 1952) (“The truth of the matter is that this affidavit adds one more reinforcing 
increment to my conviction that Sales Affiliates is forum shopping with a vengeance. I 
discern no other rationale which can adequately explain the stratagems which it has 
employed throughout this controversy. Our courts are not meant for such use.”). But see 
Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L. REV. 553 
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jurisprudence enables forum shopping by allowing plaintiffs to file an 
action in the forum of their choice. Moreover, defendants are able to 
engage in forum shopping by removing an action to federal court, filing a 
motion to transfer venue, or filing a motion to dismiss for forum non 
conveniens.35 
Forum shopping is objectionable because it enables parties to choose 
a forum that is biased in their favor. But parties engage in forum shopping 
for many different reasons. While choosing a biased forum is harmful, 
choosing an impartial, efficient, or convenient forum is beneficial. The 
problem is not that parties are shopping for a favorable forum, but that 
they can buy harmful bias.36 
C. Empirical Evidence of Forum Shopping in Patent Infringement 
Actions 
Empirical evidence strongly suggests that many patent plaintiffs 
engage in forum shopping for the purpose of choosing a forum that is 
biased in their favor. The district in which a patent infringement action is 
litigated clearly affects the predicted outcome.37 Unsurprisingly, patent 
plaintiffs tend to choose districts that increase their likelihood of success.38 
While patent plaintiffs have probably always engaged in forum shopping, 
it has become increasingly prevalent in the last 20 years.39 Several studies 
have shown that patent plaintiffs overwhelmingly prefer those particular 
districts which tend to favor them and which defendants avoid.40 Notably, 
                                                                                                             
(1989) (arguing that there is nothing inherently objectionable about forum shopping); and 
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984) (“Petitioner’s successful 
search for a State with a lengthy statute of limitations is no different from the litigation 
strategy of countless plaintiffs who seek a forum with favorable substantive or procedural 
rules or sympathetic local populations.”). 
35 See generally Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of 
Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1511 (1995); and Juenger, supra note 34. 
36 See generally Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 1515. 
37 Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice 
Affect Innovation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889 (2001) (employing the use of data from “every 
patent case that was terminated by any means (e.g., settlement, dismissal, judgment) from 
1995 to 1999 (five years of data) in every district court (9615 cases) and every patent case 
that went to trial (1409 cases with 1943 separate claims) from the period 1983 to 1999 
(seventeen years of data).”) 
38 See Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 401, 403 (2010) 
(recommending preferential jurisdictions on the basis of data from “records of the thirty-
three most active patent district courts, considering plaintiff win rate, the likelihood of 
getting to trial, and the speed of the forum”). 
39 Compare Moore, supra note 37, at 937 (showing some evidence of forum shopping), 
with Love & Yoon, supra note 8, and Lemley, supra note 38 (showing overwhelming 
evidence of forum shopping). 
40 See Love & Yoon, supra note 8; Lemley, supra note 38; Moore, supra note 37. 
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the patent plaintiffs who most aggressively engage in forum shopping are 
patent assertion entities.41 
Currently, the forum of choice for patent plaintiffs is the Eastern 
District of Texas.42 For about a decade, the Eastern District of Texas has 
heard more patent infringement actions than any other district.43 And in 
2016 alone, it heard almost half of the patent infringement actions filed in 
the United States.44 On its face, the Eastern District of Texas’s remarkable 
popularity with patent plaintiffs is surprising because it lacks a major 
corporate, technology, or population center.45 
Empirical studies of the Eastern District of Texas’s powerful appeal 
to patent plaintiffs are inconclusive. Some scholars have suggested that 
patent plaintiffs are attracted by its relatively uncongested docket and 
speedy resolution of patent actions.46 Others have suggested that they are 
attracted by its pro-plaintiff jury pool.47 And still others have observed that 
certain judges in the Eastern District of Texas deliberately attracted patent 
plaintiffs by adopting pro-plaintiff procedures and local rules.48 While 
                                                                                                             
41 See Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman, & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: 
Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L. TECH. REV. 357 (2012) 
(finding that patent assertion entities have increased from 22% of the cases filed in 2006 to 
almost 40% of the cases filed in 2011). 
42 See Love & Yoon, supra note 8. 
43 See James Pistorino, Concentration of Patent Cases in Eastern District of Texas 
Increases in 2010, 81 BNA PAT., COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK J. 803 (2011), 
http://www.perkinscoie.com/files/upload/PL_11_04Pistorino.pdf; Yan Leychkis, Of Fire 
Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern 
District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 Yale J. L. & Tech. 193, 
204-05 (2007). 
44 See Love & Yoon, supra note 8. 
45 Klerman & Reilly, supra note 7, at 248-250; see also James C. Pistorino & Susan J. 
Crane, 2011 Trends in Patent Case Filings: Eastern District of Texas Continues to Lead 
Until America Invents Act is Signed, Perkins Coie 10 (March 2012), https://www.perkinsc
oie.com/images/content/2/0/v2/2058/pl-12-03pistorinoarticle.pdf (showing Eastern 
District of Texas filings by division); PACER, https://www.pacer.gov/map.html (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2015) (providing a map outlining the boundaries of the districts in Texas). 
46 Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Justice Scalia’s “Renegade District”: Lessons for Patent Law 
Reform, 83 TUL. L. REV. 111, 141 (2008) (noting the relatively quick disposition of cases 
in the district as compared to its peers); Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim 
Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as 
a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J. L. & TECH. 193, 209-15 (2007) 
(considering the district to be a rocket docket, wherein cases are quickly resolved). 
47 Love & Yoon, supra note 8, at 13. 
48 “Judges in the Eastern District have themselves acknowledged a desire to attract 
patent cases. For example, Judge T. John Ward, the original architect of the Eastern 
District’s patent docket, explained that ‘when I came to the bench, I sought out patent 
cases.’ . . . The Eastern District’s use of procedural rules and discretion in procedural 
matters to attract cases is almost completely shielded from appellate review by the abuse 
of discretion standard of review applicable to most procedural decisions, the harmless error 
doctrine, and the final judgment rule.” Klerman & Reilly, supra note 7, at 250 (citing Allan 
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some combination of these factors is probably driving the remarkable 
appeal of the Eastern District of Texas to patent plaintiffs, existing 
empirical studies of the phenomenon are descriptive, and do not claim to 
identify its causes. 
D. Forum Selling 
“Forum selling” is a term Daniel Klerman coined to describe 
jurisdictional competition among courts intended to attract litigants.49 It is 
hardly a new phenomenon. For example, scholars have long recognized 
that jurisdictional competition among the Court of Common Pleas, King’s 
Bench, and Exchequer affected the evolution of the common law.50 
Daniel Klerman and Greg Reilly observe that forum selling can be 
either beneficial or harmful, depending on the circumstances and the 
relationship between the parties. Specifically, while consensual forum 
selling may be beneficial, non-consensual forum selling is typically 
harmful. For example, forum selling may be beneficial in relation to some 
contractual forum selection clauses, because sophisticated contracting 
parties have a mutual incentive to select an unbiased and efficient forum.51 
Likewise, forum selling may be beneficial when all parties must consent 
to the forum, because parties will only consent to litigation in an unbiased, 
efficient forum. But non-consensual forum selling is harmful because 
plaintiffs have an incentive to choose a forum that is biased in their favor. 
Accordingly, non-consensual forum selling creates an incentive for courts 
to adopt a pro-plaintiff bias, in order to attract litigants. 
Forum selling has become conspicuously prevalent in patent 
infringement actions. In 2013, about half of all patent infringement actions 
                                                                                                             
Pusey, Marshall Law: Patent Lawyers Flock to East Texas Court for its Expertise and 
‘Rocket Docket,’ Dall. Morning News, Mar. 26, 2006, at 1D). It has been suggested that 
the district’s pro-plaintiff propensity is a holdover from days when its docket was 
dominated by personal injury, products liability, and medical malpractice litigation, prior 
to tort reform. Ronen Avraham & John M. Golden, From PI to IP: Yet Another Unexpected 
Effect of Tort Reform (U. of Tex. Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 211, 2012), https:
//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=1878966 (demonstrating empirically the 
Eastern District of Texas’ shift from a tort-dominant docket to a patent-dominated docket); 
Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2006), 
www.nytimes.com/2006/09/24/business/24ward.html. However, by measures of jury 
awards, the district is no more pro-plaintiff—and perhaps slightly less plaintiff friendly—
than other districts with largely patent dockets. See Love & Yoon, supra note 8, at 20. 
49 Klerman & Reilly, supra note 7, at 242-246. 
50 See generally Daniel M. Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of 
the Common Law, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. (2007); see also John H. Baker, INTRODUCTION TO 
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 40-47 (4th ed. 2002); Todd Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of 
Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1551 (2003). 
51 As Klerman and Reilly observe, contractual forum selling may not be beneficial if 
one of the parties is not sophisticated. Klerman & Reilly, supra note 7, at 242-46. 
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were filed in just two districts, neither of which is home to many patent 
practitioners: the Eastern District of Texas and the District of Delaware.52 
Since then, the percentage of patent infringement actions filed in the 
Eastern District of Texas has increased, approaching 50%, and the 
percentage filed in the District of Delaware has decreased to about 10%, 
at least in part because the America Invents Act of 2011 prevented the 
Eastern District of Texas from allowing patent plaintiffs to join many 
unrelated defendants in a single action.53 
The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals of all 
patent infringement actions, so districts cannot compete on substantive 
law, but they can compete on procedural and administrative rules. Indeed, 
the Federal Circuit’s exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals may have 
encouraged districts to engage in forum selling.54 The evidence strongly 
suggests that the Eastern District of Texas has pursued an aggressive 
policy of non-consensual forum selling, by adopting uniformly pro-
plaintiff procedures and local rules. By contrast, while District of 
Delaware may also have engaged in some non-consensual forum selling, 
it has recently shifted its focus to efficiency and impartiality. Apparently, 
biased jurisdictions are more competitive than unbiased jurisdictions, an 
unsurprising outcome, given that plaintiffs are entitled to their choice of 
forum, and they have a strong incentive to choose a forum that is biased in 
their favor, especially if they can keep it. 
E. Forum Selling in the Eastern District of Texas 
Empirical studies aside, the Eastern District of District of Texas has 
clearly pursued an aggressive policy of non-consensual forum selling by 
deliberately adopting pro-plaintiff procedures and local rules.55 The 
numbers speak for themselves. The Eastern District of Texas is a rural 
district, home to few, if any, patent owners or practitioners. Yet, in the last 
decade, it has become the improbable forum of choice for patent plaintiffs. 
                                                                                                             
52 J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 632-
33 (2015). Other popular venues for patent infringement actions are the Central District of 
California, the Northern District of California, the Northern District of Illinois, the District 
of New Jersey, the Southern District of New York, the Southern District of California, the 
Southern District of Florida, and the District of Massachusetts, all of which are home to 
many patent practitioners or their parent companies. Klerman & Reilly, supra note 7, at 
249. 
53 Klerman & Reilly, supra note 7, at 257-58 (citing Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011) (amending U.S.C. tit. 25)). 
54 Anderson, supra note 52, at 635. 
55 See, e.g., Klerman & Reilly, supra note 7; see also Loren Steffy, Patently Unfair, 
TEXAS MONTHLY October 2014, http://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/patently-unfair/. 
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In 2016, about 44% of all patent infringement actions were filed in the 
Eastern District of Texas.56 
Some scholars have argued that the Eastern District of Texas hears 
most of the patent actions filed in the United States simply because it is 
the best forum in which to litigate a patent infringement action.57 
Supposedly, it has specialized judges, procedures, and rules that appeal to 
patent litigants. In other words, those scholars argue that the Eastern 
District of Texas is actually engaged in consensual forum selling. But this 
argument is belied by the decisions of patent litigants. The Eastern District 
of Texas is only the forum of choice for patent plaintiffs, not defendants. 
Only a vanishingly small number of prospective patent defendants file 
declaratory judgment actions in the Eastern District of Texas.58 
The only plausible explanation for the Eastern District of Texas’s 
remarkably rapid dominance of patent litigation is forum selling. The 
Eastern District of Texas did not appeal to patent plaintiffs until it adopted 
aggressively pro-plaintiff procedures and local rules. And its appeal to 
patent plaintiffs rapidly increased as it dialed up its pro-plaintiff bias, by 
adopting ever more discriminatory procedures and local rules and ignoring 
the Federal Circuit’s efforts to limit its bias. Notably, the late Justice Scalia 
even explicitly referred to the Eastern District of Texas as a “renegade” 
jurisdiction, based on its egregious non-consensual forum selling in patent 
actions.59 
Tellingly, the overwhelming majority of plaintiffs who file patent 
infringement actions in the Eastern District of Texas are patent assertion 
entities, or “patent trolls.”60 Between January 2014 and June 2016, about 
94% of the patent infringement actions filed in the Eastern District of 
                                                                                                             
56 Love & Yoon, supra note 8, at 3. 
57 See, e.g., Nguyen, supra note 46, at 141; see also Leychkis, supra note 46, at 204-05. 
58 See Love & Yoon, supra note 8, at 12; see also Klerman & Reilly, supra note 7. 
59 Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 
(2006) (No. 05-130). 
60 See Jeff Bounds, Patent Cases Flood East Texas Courts, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Aug. 
14, 2015), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/business/article/Patent-cases-flood-East-Tex
as-courts-6444470.php. “High volume plaintiffs accounted for 650 new patent cases in the 
Eastern District in the April to June period, or 77 percent of the new caseload. High-volume 
plaintiffs are often, but not always, businesses that make money exclusively by wringing 
licensing fees and settlements out of businesses that may infringe the patents those 
plaintiffs control.” Id.; see also Daniel Nazer & Vera Ranieri, Why Do Patent Trolls Go to 
Texas? It’s Not for the BBQ, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUNDATION (July 9, 2014), https://www.ef
f.org/deeplinks/2014/07/why-do-patent-trolls-go-texas-its-not-bbq; Mark Liang, The 
Aftermath of TS Tech: The End of Forum Shopping in Patent Litigation and Implications 
for Non-practicing Entities, 19 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 29, 31 (2010) (citing Daniel P. 
McCurdy, Patent Trolls Erode the Foundation of the U.S. Patent System, SCIENCE 
PROGRESS (Jan.12, 2009), http://www.scienceprogress.org/2009/01/patent-trolls-erode-pat
ent-system. 
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Texas were filed by patent assertion entities.61 By contrast, about 60% of 
the patent infringement actions filed in the District of Delaware were filed 
by patent assertion entities, and about 45%. of the patent infringement 
actions filed in districts other than the Eastern District of Texas were filed 
by patent assertion entities.62 
Initially, the Eastern District of Texas’s success with forum selling in 
patent actions is surprising. But it should not be, as the Eastern District of 
Texas has long experience with non-consensual forum selling. It cut its 
teeth on forum selling in the 1980s, when it became the forum of choice 
for mass tort actions by adopting pro-plaintiff procedures and rules. When 
tort reform limited its ability to attract tort plaintiffs, the Eastern District 
of Texas turned its attention to attracting patent plaintiffs.63 
The Eastern District of Texas has adopted an assortment of procedural 
rules and practices that make it unusually attractive to patent plaintiffs. It 
resists granting summary judgment, requires extensive early discovery, 
refuses to stay patent infringement actions pending reexamination by the 
Patent Office, sends cases to trial relatively quickly, and tends to impanel 
plaintiff-friendly juries.64 Moreover, while most district courts randomize 
case assignments to prevent “judge shopping,” the Eastern District of 
Texas allows plaintiffs to choose the division in which their cases will 
proceed, effectively allowing plaintiffs the ability to select the judge 
before whom the case will be heard, thus increasing the power the plaintiff 
wields when selecting the forum.65 It also allows plaintiffs to join or 
                                                                                                             
61 Love & Yoon, supra note 8, at 9 tbl.2. 
62 Id. 
63 See id. at 15-16; see generally Avraham & Golden, supra note 48. 
64 See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 7, at 251-52. Given that dockets with a high 
percentage of cases resolved by dispositive motion are generally considered to be pro-
defendant, a very low summary judgment rate is likely indicative of a pro-plaintiff cultural 
disposition of the court. See also Paul M. Janicke, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation: Now a Strengthened Traffic Cop for Patent Venue, 32 REV. LITIG. 497, 502 
(2013) (observing that summary judgment is “somewhat culturally foreign in the Eastern 
District”). Andrei Iancu & Jay Chung, Real Reasons the Eastern District of Texas Draws 
Patent Cases—Beyond Lore and Anecdote, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 299, 316–17 & 
n.88 (2011) (analyzing data from 1991–2010); Lemley, supra note 38, at 403. 
65 See Anderson, supra note 52, at 670-673. For an explanation of the purpose of case 
randomization, see United States v. Mavroules, 798 F. Supp. 61, 61 (D. Mass 1992) (noting 
that case randomization “prevents judge shopping by any party, thereby enhancing public 
confidence in the assignment process”) and Paul R. Gugliuzza and Megan M. La Belle, 
The Patently Unexceptional Venue Statute, 66 AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
(manuscript at 29), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2914091. “This ability to choose the division 
effectively determines the judge because of another unusual practice in East Texas whereby 
the Chief Judge assigns cases by general order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 137. The most recent 
of these orders provides for the following case allocation: 100% of patent cases filed in the 
Beaumont Division are assigned to Chief Judge Ron Clark; 95% of all civil cases 
(including patent cases) filed in the Marshall Division are assigned to Judge Rodney 
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consolidate patent infringement actions against unrelated defendants, and 
it manages these cases in ways that advantage plaintiffs, such as limiting 
the amount of time available to each individual defendant. 
But perhaps most importantly, the Eastern District of Texas refuses to 
transfer patent infringement actions, even though a different district is 
more appropriate in essentially every case.66 Moreover, when the Eastern 
District of Texas does transfer actions, it takes much longer to do so than 
other districts, about 100 days longer than the average.67 The Eastern 
District of Texas receives far more motions to transfer venue than the 
District of Delaware and grants fewer of those motions, even though the 
District of Delaware typically has a much stronger connection to patent 
defendants than the Eastern District of Texas. Most of the patent 
defendants sued in the District of Delaware are incorporated in Delaware. 
By contrast, most of the patent defendants sued in the Eastern District of 
Texas have no connection to the district or to Texas.68 
The Eastern District of Texas also has unusually broad and demanding 
discovery requirements, and it has adopted a local rule that requires 
defendants to comply with discovery requests even if a motion to dismiss, 
remand, or transfer is pending.69 The Eastern District of Texas also orders 
discovery much earlier than other districts, including the District of 
Delaware.70 
The combination of early discovery and refusal to transfer made the 
Eastern District of Texas the forum of choice for patent assertion entities 
asserting weak patents with the intention of settling early for a fraction of 
the defendant’s projected litigation costs.71 Patent plaintiffs asserting 
strong claims will consider many different factors when choosing a forum, 
including efficiency, impartiality, and convenience. But patent plaintiffs 
asserting weak claims will focus on factors that enable them to extract a 
nuisance settlement as quickly as possible. 
                                                                                                             
Gilstrap; 100% of patent cases filed in the Sherman Division are assigned to Judge Amos 
Mazzant; and 70% of patent cases filed in the Tyler Division are assigned to Judge Trey 
Schroeder. This practice explains why Judge Gilstrap heard more than 3,000 patent cases 
between 2014 and mid-2016, which is more than the total number of patent cases filed in 
California, Florida, and New York combined during the same time period.” Id. 
66 See Li Zhu, Taking Off: Recent Changes to Venue Transfer of Patent Litigation in the 
Rocket Docket, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 901 (2010). 
67 Love & Yoon, supra note 8, at 11, 16. 
68 Id. 
69 E.D. Tex R. CV-26. 
70 Love & Yoon, supra note 8, at 23 (“In a median patent case litigated before Judge 
Gilstrap in the Eastern District of Texas, fact discovery will end 66 days sooner, and expert 
discovery 157 days sooner, than in a typical patent case assigned to Judge Stark in the 
District of Delaware.”). 
71 See id. at 24. 
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The practice of refusing to transfer patent infringement actions is 
critical to the Eastern District of Texas’s forum selling strategy. If patent 
defendants could readily obtain transfer to a more appropriate venue, then 
all of the other pro-plaintiff practices would be worthless, and plaintiffs 
would no longer have an incentive to file patent infringement actions in 
the Eastern District of Texas. Accordingly, the Eastern District of Texas’s 
refusal to transfer patent infringement actions, even when transfer is 
clearly appropriate, provides strong evidence that it is engaging in a 
practice of non-consensual forum selling.72 Its repeated flouting of Federal 
Circuit opinions effectively trying to force it to grant motions to transfer 
makes that evidence conclusive. 
F. Forum Selling in the District of Delaware 
In the early 2000s, the District of Delaware became a popular forum 
for patent infringement actions. While Delaware is home to few patent 
owners or practitioners, it is the state of incorporation for most large 
corporations, at least in part because of the quality and impartiality of its 
judicial system. As a consequence, Delaware courts are interested in 
attracting commercial litigation of all kinds. 
The District of Delaware may be attractive to patent plaintiffs because 
it rarely grants summary judgment in patent actions, which increases the 
cost of litigation to defendants and gives the plaintiff additional leverage.73 
But it is possible that the District of Delaware rarely grants summary 
judgment because it hears many actions that are close cases. As Mark 
Lemley has observed, the patentee win rate in a district is a function of the 
merits of the actions filed there, and a district viewed as pro-plaintiff may 
have a deceptively low patentee win rate, if it attracts plaintiffs asserting 
weak patents.74 
The District of Delaware has a remarkably high trial rate, which could 
indicate that it hears many actions in which the outcome is uncertain.75  
However, the District of Delaware has adopted local rules increasing the 
burden on summary judgment in patent actions only.76 Notably, the 
                                                                                                             
72 It is unclear why the Eastern District of Texas adopted its policy of non-consensual 
forum selling. Some of the judges have suggested that they wanted to hear more interesting 
cases and increase the prestige of the district. Others have suggested that the judges wanted 
to help the local economy by providing work for local lawyers and customers for local 
businesses. And some have observed that the remarkable increase in patent litigation has 
personally benefited the judges, their families, and their business associates. See, e.g., 
Klerman & Reilly, supra note 7, at 270-77. 
73 Lemley, supra note 38, at 3-4. 
74 Id. at 410. 
75 Anderson, supra note 52, at 655. 
76 Id. at 674. 
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District of Delaware’s rate of grants of summary judgment in patent 
actions in recent cases is consistent with other districts at about 33%, while 
the Eastern District of Texas’s rate is considerably lower, at about 18%. 
The District of Delaware is also reluctant to grant motions to transfer 
venue.77 However, it often has a strong claim to proper venue, as many 
patent defendants are incorporated in Delaware. 
The reason for the appeal of the District of Delaware to patent litigants 
is unclear. Initially, it may have appealed to forum shopping patent 
plaintiffs because its procedures and local rules provided them with an 
advantage. It may even have engaged in some degree of forum selling in 
order to attract more patent plaintiffs. However, when the District of 
Delaware adopted new procedures and local rules calculated to make it 
more impartial, patent filings quickly decreased. Specifically, the District 
of Delaware adopted procedures and rules intended to make patent 
litigation more efficient, including a mediation program, regular 
consultation with the patent bar, uniform jury instructions, and an 
accelerated trial schedule.78 While the District of Delaware has a relatively 
high patentee win rate in patent infringement actions, it is nevertheless the 
forum of choice for many accused infringers who file declaratory 
judgment actions for noninfringement.79 
The Federal Circuit typically affirms appeals from the District of 
Delaware.80 For example, in 2015 the Federal Circuit affirmed in over 70% 
of appeals from the District of Delaware, but only 39% of appeals from 
the Eastern District of Texas. Over a longer time frame, the Eastern 
District of Texas’s affirmance rate improves, but its affirmance rate 
decreased as its patent selling activity increased. 
G. Transfer of Venue in Patent Actions 
The Eastern District of Texas can systematically refuse to transfer 
patent infringement actions only because a district court’s decision to grant 
or deny a motion to transfer receives extremely deferential review. 
Whether venue is proper is a question of law reviewed de novo.81 But if 
venue is proper, the decision whether to transfer venue requires an exercise 
of judgment.82 
A district court may transfer an action in which venue is proper to 
another district “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses” and “in 
                                                                                                             
77 Id. at 676. 
78 See John E. Kidd, Keeto H. Sabharwal, The District of Delaware: An Ideal Venue for 
Patent Litigators, Del. Law, Winter 2000, at 17. 
79 Lemley, supra note 38, at 410. 
80 See Kidd and Sabharwal, supra note 78, at 16. 
81 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2012). 
82 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). 
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the interest of justice.”83 A district court considering a motion to transfer 
should consider several factors related to the convenience of the parties 
and the proper administration of justice.84 If the district court denies a 
motion to transfer, this denial may be challenged by filing a petition for a 
writ of mandamus, which shall be granted only if petitioner shows a “clear 
and indisputable” right to relief.85 
Mandamus is an extraordinary and unusual remedy. Historically, 
courts were extremely reluctant to grant mandamus relief, although they 
have become more liberal with it in recent years. The Federal Circuit has 
remained averse to mandamus relief. Initially, the Federal Circuit’s 
interpretation of its mandamus authority was confused and extremely 
limited. Essentially, it held that it could only exercise mandamus over 
patent-related issues and not over other issues presented to the district 
court.86 
In reviewing the Eastern District of Texas’s decisions to deny motions 
to transfer patent infringement actions, the Federal Circuit has applied the 
Fifth Circuit’s deferential standard of review used for reviewing a petition 
for mandamus challenging the denial of a motion to transfer.87 Under that 
standard of review, a circuit court should grant a petition for a writ of 
mandamus ordering a district court to transfer an action only if it finds a 
“clear abuse of discretion” that produced a “patently erroneous result.”88 
                                                                                                             
83 Id. 
84 See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 2244 (1988). In determining 
whether to grant a motion to transfer, a court should consider several non-exclusive 
“private” and “public” interest factors. The private interest factors include: (1) the relative 
ease of access to sources of proof; (2) the availability of compulsory process to secure the 
attendance of witnesses; (3) the cost of attendance for willing witnesses; and (4) all other 
practical problems that make a trial easy, expeditious and inexpensive. The public interest 
factors to be considered are: (1) the administrative difficulties flowing from court 
congestion; (2) the local interest in having localized interests decided at home; (3) the 
familiarity of the forum with the law that will govern the case; and (4) the avoidance of 
unnecessary problems of conflicts of law or in the application of foreign law. See Piper 
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 258 (1981). 
85 Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 190 (1980). 
86 See In re Innotron Diagnostics, 800 F.2d 1077, 1081-86 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also 
Paul R. Gugliuzza, The New Federal Circuit Mandamus, 45 IND. L. REV. 343, 368 (2012). 
87 In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing In re 
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir.2008) (en banc)). The Federal Circuit 
applies its own law to patent questions, but applies the law of the relevant regional circuit 
court to non-patent questions; see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case 
Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 59 (1989). There is no reason for regional 
circuit courts to have different law governing the review of a district court’s denial of a 
motion to transfer venue. 
88 In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 315 (5th Cir.2008) (en banc)) (citing 
Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98 n. 6, 88 S. Ct. 269, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967) and 
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According the Fifth Circuit, “A district court abuses its discretion if it: (1) 
relies on clearly erroneous factual findings; (2) relies on erroneous 
conclusions of law; or (3) misapplies the law to the facts.”89 But a Circuit 
Court should grant mandamus relief only if an abuse of discretion 
produces a “patently erroneous result.”90 
Despite this extraordinarily deferential standard of review, the Federal 
Circuit has repeatedly ordered the Eastern District of Texas to transfer 
patent infringement actions. But the Eastern District of Texas has 
consistently ignored the Federal Circuit’s instructions regarding the proper 
standard for evaluating a motion to transfer and the evidence that is 
relevant to the public and private factors informing the decision whether 
to grant a motion to transfer. 
Prior to 2008, the Federal Circuit had rarely granted a writ of 
mandamus and ordered a district court to transfer a patent infringement 
action.91 Since then, it has granted eleven, ten of which were interlocutory 
appeals from the Eastern District of Texas.92 This is highly unusual 
because mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and the Federal Circuit’s 
exercise of mandamus has historically been quite conservative.93 
In 2008, the Federal Circuit ordered the Eastern District of Texas to 
transfer a patent infringement action to the Southern District of Ohio. Lear 
Corporation filed a patent infringement action against TS Tech USA 
Corporation, et al, in the Eastern District of Texas. TS Tech filed a motion 
to transfer to the Southern District of Ohio where the documentary 
evidence and witnesses were located, noting that none of the parties had 
any connection to Texas. The court denied the motion on the grounds that 
venue was proper and that several products embodying the allegedly 
infringed patent had been sold in the Eastern District of Texas. TS Tech 
filed a petition for mandamus, which the Federal Circuit granted, finding 
that the district court had clearly abused its discretion.94 
In 2009, the Federal Circuit ordered the Eastern District of Texas to 
transfer a patent infringement action to the Eastern District of North 
                                                                                                             
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382–83, 74 S. Ct. 145, 98 L. Ed. 106 
(1953)). 
89 McClure v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 2003). 
90 In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d at 310. 
91 Gugliuzza, supra note 86, at 347-48. “In its early days, the Federal Circuit at times 
disclaimed supervisory authority over district courts and refused to grant mandamus on 
any issue that did not implicate the court’s patent law, including transfer of venue . . . . 
[M]andamus has been and remains a difficult remedy to obtain in the Federal Circuit. From 
2000 through 2010, the Federal Circuit granted only 23 of the 215 mandamus petitions it 
decided” (internal citations omitted). Id. 
92 See id. 
93 Gugliuzza, supra note 86, at 345-47. 
94 In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d at 1321. 
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Carolina. Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics, Inc., a California-based 
corporation, filed a patent infringement action against Hoffmann–La 
Roche Inc., et al in the Eastern District of Texas. Hoffman-LaRoche filed 
a motion to transfer the action to the Eastern District of North Carolina, 
where most of the documentary evidence and witnesses were located. The 
Eastern District of Texas denied the motion on the grounds that witnesses 
and evidence were spread around the country, and Novartis had transferred 
75,000 pages of electronic documents to the Eastern District of Texas. 
Hoffman-LaRoche filed a petition for mandamus, which the Federal 
Circuit again granted, finding that the Eastern District of Texas had clearly 
abused its discretion, specifically repudiating its reliance on the presence 
of electronic documents in Texas.95 
In 2010, the Federal Circuit ordered the Eastern District of Texas to 
transfer a patent infringement action to the Northern District of Indiana. 
MedIdea, LLC filed a patent infringement action against Zimmer 
Holdings, Inc. et al in the Eastern District of Texas. MedIdea was a 
Michigan corporation headquartered in Michigan, and Zimmer was 
headquartered in Indiana. Zimmer filed a motion to transfer the action to 
either the Northern District of Indiana or the Eastern District of Michigan. 
The district court denied the motion because: MedIdea had an office in the 
Eastern District of Texas in which it “likely” kept relevant evidence; the 
court should defer to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; and MedIdea had filed 
another action litigating the same patent in the Eastern District of Texas. 
Zimmer filed a petition for mandamus, which the Federal Circuit granted, 
finding that MedIdea’s claim to be based in Texas was a sham, most of the 
evidence and witnesses were located in the Northern District of Indiana, 
and hearing the two different actions in the same court would not increase 
efficiency.96 
Finally, in 2011, the Federal Circuit ordered the Eastern District of 
Texas to transfer a patent infringement action to the Western District of 
Washington. Allvoice Developments U.S., LLC filed a patent 
infringement action against Microsoft Corporation in the Eastern District 
of Texas. Allvoice was a United Kingdom company with a subsidiary LLC 
formed under Texas law and an office in Texas. Microsoft is 
headquartered in the Western District of Washington. Microsoft filed a 
motion to transfer the action to the Western District of Washington. The 
district court denied this motion because Allvoice was a Texas LLC with 
an office in Texas. Microsoft filed a petition for mandamus, which the 
Federal Circuit granted, finding that most of the evidence and witnesses 
were located in the Western District of Washington. It specifically rejected 
                                                                                                             
95 In re Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 587 F.3d 1333, 1336-38 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
96 In re Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 609 F.3d 1378, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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the district court’s reliance on Allvoice’s connections to Texas, observing 
that connections with a forum created in anticipation of litigation should 
be ignored.97 
H. TC Heartland v. Kraft 
On January 14, 2014, Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC filed a patent 
infringement action against TC Heartland LLC and Heartland Packaging 
Corporation (“HPC”) in the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware, alleging that TC Heartland’s “liquid water enhancer products” 
infringed three of Kraft’s patents.98 Kraft is a Delaware limited liability 
company headquartered in Northfield, Illinois. TC Heartland is an Indiana 
limited liability company, headquartered in Carmel, Indiana, and HPC is 
a defunct Indiana corporation. TC Heartland manufactures liquid water 
enhancer products in Carmel and Indianapolis, Indiana. It is not registered 
to do business in Delaware, and it has no contact with Delaware other than 
sending products there. In 2013, TC Heartland sent about 2% of its 
allegedly infringing liquid water enhancer products to Delaware.99 
On June 23, 2014, TC Heartland filed a motion to dismiss for lack of 
personal jurisdiction and for transfer of venue to the Southern District of 
Indiana. The district court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, finding that it could exercise personal jurisdiction consistent 
with due process because TC Heartland “knowingly and intentionally 
shipped a significant number of accused products directly to Delaware.100 
The district court also denied the motion to transfer venue to the Southern 
District of Indiana, finding that venue was proper in the District of 
Delaware and that the convenience of the parties and the interests of justice 
were not “strongly in favor” of transfer.101 
                                                                                                             
97 In re Microsoft Corp., 630 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
98 A “liquid water enhancer” is a small bottle of concentrated liquid intended to flavor, 
color, and sweeten water. They use natural or artificial non-caloric sweeteners, and often 
include vitamin supplements. The allegedly infringed patents are: U.S. Patent No. 
8,293,299 (“Containers and methods for dispensing multiple doses of a concentrated liquid, 
and shelf stable Concentrated liquids”); U.S. Patent No. 8,511,472 (“Containers having 
perforated shrink wrap sleeves”); and U.S. Patent No. 8,603,557 (“Containers and methods 
for dispensing multiple doses of a concentrated liquid, and shelf stable concentrated 
liquids”). Complaint, Kraft Foods Group Brands LLC v. TC Heartland LLC et al, No. 
1:14CV00028 (D. Del. Jan. 14, 2014). 
99 Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. TC Heartland, LLC, No. 14-28-LPS, 2015 WL 
4778828, at *1 (D. Del. Aug. 13, 2015), adopted by, No. 14-28-LPS, 2015 WL 5613160 
(D. Del. Sept. 24, 2015). The report states that Kraft is a “corporation,” but that is 
inconsistent with the name of the company and the records of the Delaware Secretary of 
State. 
100 Id. at *4-*5. 
101 Id. at *15. 
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First, TC Heartland argued that the district court was required to 
transfer venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) because patent venue was 
improper in the District of Delaware.102 TC Heartland argued that the 2011 
amendments of the general venue statute limited the application of its 
definition of corporate residence to general venue and caused the 
definition of corporate residence for the purpose of patent venue to revert 
to a defendant corporation’s “state of incorporation, or ‘where the 
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and 
established place of business.’”103 The district court disagreed, finding that 
the 2011 amendments did not limit the application of the general venue 
statute’s definition of corporate residence and did not affect the definition 
of corporate residence for the purpose of patent venue.104 
Second, TC Heartland’s motion asserted that the court should transfer 
the action to the Southern District of Indiana under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) 
for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of 
justice.105 TC Heartland argued that the Southern District of Indiana was 
the proper venue because: “(1) that is TC Heartland’s principal place of 
business and is where the claims arose; (2) that location is closer than is 
Delaware to Kraft’s principal place of business; and (3) there are potential 
third party witnesses in that district who may be called as trial witnesses 
regarding the state of the relevant art.”106 After considering the private and 
public interest factors deemed relevant to transfer of venue by the Third 
Circuit, the district court found that they were “not ‘strongly in favor of’” 
transfer.107 Specifically, it found that: plaintiff’s choice of forum, 
administrative difficulties, and public policy weighed against transfer; the 
defendant’s choice of forum, where the claim arose, and the convenience 
of the parties   favored the transfer; and the remainder of the factors were 
neutral.108 
                                                                                                             
102 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (“The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying 
venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, 
transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.”). 
103 Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. TC Heartland, LLC, No. 14-28-LPS, 2015 WL 
4778828, at *7 n. 11 (D. Del. Aug. 13, 2015), adopted by, No. 14-28-LPS, 2015 WL 
5613160 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 2015). 
104 Id. at *7-*10. 
105 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of 
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where 
it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have 
consented.”). 
106 Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. TC Heartland, LLC, No. 14-28-LPS, 2015 WL 
4778828, at *11 n. 11 (D. Del. Aug. 13, 2015), adopted by, No. 14-28-LPS, 2015 WL 
5613160 (D. Del. Sept. 24, 2015). 
107 Id. at *11-*15. 
108 Id. at *15 (citing Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
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TC Heartland petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus 
ordering the District of Delaware to dismiss the action or transfer it to the 
Southern District of Indiana. The Federal Circuit denied the petition, 
holding that venue was proper in the District of Delaware and that the 
District of Delaware could exercise personal jurisdiction over TC 
Heartland consistent with due process. Most importantly, the Federal 
Circuit held that the 2011 amendments of the general venue statute did not 
affect the application of its definition of corporate residency to the patent 
venue statute.109 On September 12, 2016, TC Heartland filed a petition for 
certiorari, asking whether the definition of corporate residency provided 
in the general venue statute also applies to the patent venue statute. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 14, 2016, and heard oral 
argument on March 27, 2017.110 
I. Fixing Forum Selling 
The evidence shows that patent infringement litigation is concentrated 
in the Eastern District of Texas because it has pursued an aggressive policy 
of non-consensual forum selling by adopting pro-plaintiff procedures and 
local rules. The Eastern District of Texas overwhelmingly attracts patent 
infringement actions filed by patent assertion entities, often asserting weak 
patents for their nuisance value. As other districts reform their procedures 
and rules to make them more impartial, the Eastern District of Texas’s 
attractiveness to patent plaintiffs, especially patent assertion entities, has 
only increased. 
While consensual forum selling may be beneficial, non-consensual 
forum selling is harmful. But how can we prevent the Eastern District of 
Texas from pursuing non-consensual forum selling in patent infringement 
actions? Some scholars have suggested an overhaul of the patent litigation 
system. For example, much as Congress gave almost exclusive appellate 
jurisdiction over patent infringement actions to the Federal Circuit, it could 
give exclusive original jurisdiction over patent infringement actions to a 
single district court, perhaps headquartered in Washington, D.C., like the 
Federal Circuit.111 But that would be a costly and rather drastic move, 
which could replicate some of concerns associated with the Federal 
Circuit, like its unconscious pro-patent bias. 
Other scholars have argued that mandatory delays in discovery could 
help prevent non-consensual forum selling, but caution that abuse of 
                                                                                                             
109 In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338, 1341-43 (Fed. Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. 
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Grp. LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016). 
110 TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Food Brands Grp. LLC, 137 S. Ct. 614 (2016). 
111 Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444 (2010). 
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discretion could limit the effectiveness of procedural reforms.112 Still, 
other scholars contend that Congress could prevent forum selling in patent 
actions by limiting the scope of patent venue.113 Congress has considered 
the VENUE Act, which would limit the scope of patent venue. Likewise, 
the Supreme Court could limit the scope of patent venue by adopting TC 
Heartland’s interpretation of the patent venue statute.114 As Colleen Chien 
and Michael Risch have observed, if Congress were to enact pending 
patent venue legislation or if the Supreme Court were to adopt TC 
Heartland’s interpretation of the patent venue statute, then about half of 
patent infringement actions filed by non-practicing entities would have to 
be filed in a different forum, and the same goes for about two-thirds of 
those filed in the Eastern District of Texas.115 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in TC Heartland in the shadow 
of the Eastern District of Texas’s egregious and improper embrace of 
forum selling to patent plaintiffs. A ruling in TC Heartland’s favor would 
prevent the Eastern District of Texas from continuing this practice.  
However, the facts of TC Heartland do not suggest that the District of 
Delaware is engaged in improper forum selling, and Delaware is at least 
arguably a proper forum for the action. If the Supreme Court overrules the 
Federal Circuit’s decision in VE Holding and holds that the 1988 
amendment of the general venue statute did not change the definition of 
corporate residence for the purpose of patent venue, it would certainly 
prevent forum selling. But perhaps it would solve the problem of forum 
selling by unduly limiting the scope of venue in patent infringement 
actions.116 
Venue necessarily operates in tandem with personal jurisdiction. 
Historically, Congress has gradually expanded the scope of both personal 
jurisdiction and venue, especially in relation to corporations. Today, 
personal jurisdiction and venue typically allow a federal court to hear an 
action against a corporation in any forum in which the corporation does 
business. This is probably as it should be. As technology gradually 
                                                                                                             
112 Love & Yoon, supra note 8, at 34-35. 
113 See id. at 35. 
114 Fromer, supra note 111, at 1477. 
115 Colleen V. Chien & Michael Risch, Recalibrating Patent Venue, MD L. REV., 
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 34-35), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2834130. 
116 One of the authors of this Article, Brian L. Frye, joined the Brief of Amici Curiae 56 
Professors of Law and Economics in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari. While he 
agrees with the contention of the amicus brief that VE Holding was wrongly decided and 
that expanding the definition of corporate residence for the purpose of patent venue enabled 
non-consensual forum selling in patent infringement actions, he also believes that the 
alternative solution to the problem offered in this Article would be superior. See generally 
Brief of Amici Curiae 56 Professors of Law and Economics in Support of Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari, In re TC Heartland LLC, 821 F.3d 1338 (2016) (No. 16-341). 
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diminishes the importance of the geographical location of litigation, it is 
reasonable to relax rules intended to protect defendants from the burden 
of litigation in inconvenient locations. 
The patent venue statute is something of an anachronism, born of a 
time when the burden of litigating an action in an inconvenient 
geographical location was still quite substantial. Presumably, Congress 
intended the patent venue statute to encourage nationwide commerce by 
protecting defendants from patent infringement litigation in geographical 
locations where they only sold products. Nevertheless, in today’s world, it 
is hard to see any abstract justification for adopting different venue rules 
solely for patent infringement actions. If venue is typically proper in an 
action against a corporate defendant in any district where the defendant 
corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction in that action, why should 
the scope of venue be narrower in patent actions?117 
The problem with patent venue is not liberal venue rules, but non-
consensual forum selling. In other words, the problem is not that patent 
venue is proper in the Eastern District of Texas, but rather that the Eastern 
District of Texas refuses to transfer venue to more appropriate districts in 
order to engage in forum selling. If that is the case, then there is no need 
to limit the scope of venue, which could have harmful consequences in 
cases where a district is actually the most appropriate forum for litigation, 
but venue would not be proper. On the contrary, the problem can be solved 
by forcing courts to transfer actions at an early state of litigation, thereby 
eliminating their ability to engage in forum selling. If district courts must 
consider a motion to transfer before ordering discovery, then their ability 
to engage in inefficient forum selling will be eliminated. No prospective 
plaintiff will choose a venue based on its pro-plaintiff bias if the plaintiff 
knows that the action will inevitably be transferred to a more appropriate 
venue. As a result, there will be no incentive for jurisdictions to engage in 
this kind of forum selling, because it will not work. 
Accordingly, this Article suggests that the Supreme Court could solve 
the problem of inefficient forum selling by holding that district courts must 
decide a motion to transfer an action before ordering discovery. This 
solution would be easy to accomplish. It would require only a minimal 
change, and would probably increase the efficiency of the federal courts 
across the board, not just in patent infringement actions. The Supreme 
Court can accomplish this goal without changing anything else. It does not 
need to change the standard for evaluating a motion to transfer, and it does 
not need to change the standard of review for a petition for a writ of 
mandamus ordering a district court to transfer an action. If district courts 
cannot order discovery before deciding a motion to transfer, they cannot 
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engage in forum selling because defendants will be able to transfer an 
action filed in an inappropriate venue before the district court can exert 
any pressure on them. This would not only stop non-consensual forum 
selling in patent actions, but also prevent it from arising in other kinds of 
actions. In addition, it would prevent non-consensual forum selling 
without limiting the scope of legitimate venues available to plaintiffs. 
Forum shopping is common, even in the absence of non-consensual 
forum selling. Rational plaintiffs will choose the forum most favorable to 
their interests, and rational defendants will move to transfer venue if that 
forum is sufficiently unfavorable to their interests. There are legitimate 
and illegitimate reasons for plaintiffs and defendants to prefer different 
districts.118 Legitimate reasons for a patent plaintiff to prefer a district 
include its convenience for parties and witnesses, its relationship to the 
defendant and the subject matter of the action, and its reputation for quality 
and impartiality. Illegitimate reasons for a plaintiff to prefer a district 
include its reputation for pro-plaintiff bias, and vice-versa. 
Typically, motions to transfer venue provide an effective and efficient 
means of ensuring that federal actions are litigated in an appropriate 
forum. Defendants file motions to transfer venue relatively rarely, and they 
appear to improve the accuracy of outcomes at minimal expense.119 And 
that makes sense. In theory, the purpose of venue rules is to ensure that an 
action is litigated in an appropriate geographical location that is reasonably 
convenient to all of the parties. So, plaintiffs file their actions in districts 
that are convenient to them, then defendants can file motions to transfer 
venue to districts that are more convenient on the merits, and district courts 
exercise their discretion in balancing the equities and determining whether 
transfer is appropriate under the circumstances. 
That works fine when district courts are impartial and unbiased. But it 
also enables district courts to engage in non-consensual forum selling. As 
the Eastern District of Texas has amply illustrated, a court that wants to 
engage in non-consensual forum selling can simply refuse to grant motions 
to transfer venue, and can avoid appellate review by delaying its decisions 
on motion to transfer venue, allowing actions to proceed while motions to 
transfer venue are pending. 
The decisions of the Federal Circuit ordering the Eastern District of 
Texas to transfer actions to other districts show that the current standard 
of review appears to be adequate, although it could probably be relaxed 
without any negative consequences. In fact, slightly relaxing the standard 
of review might have positive consequences. As it stands, the Federal 
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Circuit seems reluctant to grant mandamus relief in any, except in the most 
egregious circumstances. While the Federal Circuit attempted to send a 
signal to the Eastern District of Texas by granting mandamus relief and 
ordering it to transfer a series of patent actions, the Eastern District of 
Texas simply ignored the Federal Circuit. 
The Supreme Court could easily solve this problem by holding that 
there is only one standard of review for abuse of discretion. The Fifth 
Circuit’s elevated standard of review for granting mandamus relief 
accomplishes nothing doctrinally, and only serves to signal to district 
courts that they can act with impunity, because the circuit courts will be 
reluctant to intervene. To say that the circuit court must find a “clear” 
abuse of discretion resulting in a “patently” erroneous result is only to say 
that circuit courts do not want to get involved and to signal to district courts 
that they can act with impunity. If the district court has abused its 
discretion, the circuit court should issue a writ of mandamus.120 
Moreover, requiring district courts to decide motions to transfer first 
should increase the efficiency of the federal court system by ensuring that 
actions reach their ultimate forum as quickly as possible. Eliminating 
inefficient non-consensual forum selling could also encourage efficient 
consensual forum selling. Some evidence suggests that before the Eastern 
District of Texas began engaging in inefficient non-consensual forum 
selling, some mutually desirable districts for patent litigation were 
emerging. If the Supreme Court tweaks its rules to prevent non-consensual 
forum selling, it could encourage districts to engage in consensual forum 
selling by offering efficient, impartial adjudication.121 
II.     CONCLUSION 
TC Heartland offers the Court the opportunity to stop non-consensual 
forum selling in patent actions by limiting the scope of patent venue. While 
that would probably stop the problem, it would also limit the scope of 
legitimate venues available to patent plaintiffs. This Article suggests that 
                                                                                                             
120 Indeed, the proposed Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination (VENUE) Act 
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the Court could solve the problem more effectively by requiring courts to 
decide motions to transfer before ordering discovery and staying 
discovery-pending appeal. That should stop non-consensual forum selling 
in patent actions and prevent it from arising in other kinds of actions, 
without limiting the scope of legitimate venues available to patent 
plaintiffs. 
